back today, after N months on the run, on my book economic disclosure complicit nice chat yesterday with some dear friends in the University: the 's argument that I "tickle" and now that I think could be of great interest (for "insiders" or not) is the so-called "risk-free rate " (or risk-free rate ).
Why devote a blog intervention on a concept apparently abstract / academic as the risk-free rate?
Why this particular interest rate is the pivot on which the wheel all the modern corporate finance (and others), and in particular is the foundation on which to build corporate valuation: translated in a nutshell, and if when you happen to have to sell / buy any activity (industrial or financial) still might not matter now da questo fantomatico risk free rate , al fine di dare un valore a ciò che state vendendo/acquistando . Ho detto "ancora adesso" per un motivo che cercherò di spiegare più avanti...
Per capire i problemi odierni di questo importantissimo attore della finanza moderna, è necessario capire c osa esso rappresenta (o cosa esso dovrebbe rappresentare, visto che siamo sempre al confine tra realtà ed accademia).
Per parlare di tasso d'interesse privo di rischio è necessario prima introdurre i concetti di rischio sistematico (e non diversificabile) e rischio specifico (e diversificabile) :
- systematic risk is, to simplify, the risk inherent in the financial system , seen as one body globally. Still in its basic form is the risk that an operator (as can be any individual who invests in the stock exchange) must accept if it wants to participate in economic and financial transactions: Such risk factors include macro- by non-governmental rationality human, such as wars, natural disasters, political unrest, etc. . For these reasons, the systematic risk is also called "non-diversifiable " as not is no way to mitigate ex ante, by operators, the risk that an investment goes bad due to a tornado or a coup ;
- specific risk is somewhat complementary to systematic risk (in the sense that always adds to it, increasing the size of the overall risk) er epresentation critical that every single financial asset (stocks, bonds, etc. .) or real (land, buildings, businesses, etc. .) has , beyond the risk factors "environmental", which correspond to systematic risk. An example will help you understand: Fiat stock will go down because is a catastrophic flood destroyed his factory in Poland ( systematic risk unweighted ex ante), is why the company has so much debt, and then investors fear may fail ( firm specific risk FIAT, which therefore can be avoided or "dilute" each other with the task of diversifying their investments, for example, buying licenses also of Volkswagen).
happens the difference between the two types of risk, understanding what the risk-free rate is (almost) a breeze.
Let us go back for a moment the concept of systematic risk (and non-diversifiable), because it is de facto the realization of the ineffable of Doom and / or the Holy Spirit, the systematic risk is not a factor that allows discriminate between an investment or another . Fatalistic one can say that every business is vulnerable to the unpredictable: once again simplifying if any investment is subject to systematic risk, then it is not worth considering systematic risk as an important variable to make their own choices on Economic and Financial .
Translated in a nutshell, "if it happens, it happens!"
Abbiamo pertanto capito che chi investe è come se non tenesse conto dell'esistenza del rischio sistematico , perché altrimenti l'economia si paralizzerebbe oggi stesso, per l'incapacità evidente di prevedere l'imprevedibile (un po' come se un imprenditore pretendesse di aprire la propria attività, sapendo però già ora se avrà successo o meno). Il rischio sistematico è come se non esistesse...
La rischiosità "vera e propria" per gli operatori economici diventa così quella espressa dal rischio specifico , che è in qualche misura prevedibile e per questo contrast, with appropriate investment policies (ie the so-called diversification of risk [specific]).
We arrived at the "core" of the problem: What then the interest rate risk-free?
It 's the return offered to an investor from a theoretical economic and financial activities (be it a stock, land or a house), which not present any risk involved, if not systematic : if we imagine that this imaginary - dare I say "legendary" - these activities without a specific risk rate of return of 2% (but it could be 1% or 5%) Well the 2% is also the coveted risk free interest rate !
The importance of the risk free rate is the fact that it ideally represents a "floor" (under which you can not go) to investors, so they know what they can not / have to accept investments that make less than risk-free rate, the performance penalty of a bad deal!
corollary of this is the definition of "risk premium (specific) " means an investment in a risk-free rate equivalent to the desire not to bear any risk, other than that systematically shared by all (or you want a specific risk equal to zero attitude often referred to as "low / no appetite for risk), and if a trader is willing to assume a greater share of risk (or to accept the specific risk), he will be rewarded with a higher yield risk free rate and this difference is precisely this "risk premium (specific)" .
Once the "teaching", we come to because the title of this posting, which seems to be dead to the interest rate risk-free.
will become clear to everyone that the definition given above risk free rate has plunged to the neck of the academy and theory and in practice it is impossible to find an activity that respects the economic and financial characteristics of absence specific risk and therefore offer a risk-free yield (specific).
This is not even escape the economic operators, which, however, had (and have) a need to identify the "floor" represented by risk free, otherwise the inability to understand whether an investment is or is not preferable to another: how? Even in this case is ricorsi ad una "finzione" , che però oggi mostra tutto il suo "lato oscuro"...
Date le definizioni di tasso privo di rischio, qualcuno ha pensato che l'entità capace più di tutte di offrire un rendimento che assomigliasse da vicino al risk free fosse niente meno che lo Stato : o meglio i titoli di debito pubblico (in Italia BOT, CCT, CTZ e BTP) emessi dai Paesi sovrani, per finanziare il proprio deficit di bilancio. L'idea di fondo era che uno Stato non possa fallire , malgrado in realtà esempi in contrasto ce ne fossero molti già diversi anni fà, e per questo i rendimenti offerti dai suoi titoli fossero esenti dal rischio specifico (o quasi).
Ovviamente furono presi in considerazione solo i titoli di debito di Paesi altamente industrializzati, sviluppati e "stabili" (come sostanzialmente tutti quelli dell'ormai ex G7), il cui rendimento divenne il famoso "pavimento" per gli investitori: se si doveva valutare un investimento in un'attività economico-finanziaria, si metteva sempre in relazione il suo rendimento con quello dei sopracitati titoli di Stato (o con un rendimento degli stessi aggiustato con il premio al rischio); chiaramente se l'attività in questione rendeva meno che un T-Bill americano, l'investitore sapeva già di dover lasciar perdere. Tutto molto (relativamente) comodo, tutto molto (Relatively) simple ...
Except that today we woke up in the knowledge that even a sovereign state can fail, like any business - see the default ( de facto if not de jure ) Greece and the increasingly difficult conditions leading countries such as Spain, Italy, Great Britain and - listen, listen! - United States.
How then can define risk-free return on government securities entities - states - which can fail or go into serious crisis in the payments? And if there's a risk-free rate (albeit approximate) to which to refer, as it is possible to make prudent evaluations of investments and asset values?
these are also the challenges and the rubble that the Great Depression left on the carpet in the world of tomorrow ...
Lord Tojo